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NOTES AND COMMENTS
THE COMMODITIES GAME HAS A NEW REFEREE*
Since at least 1200 B.C. commodities markets in some form have
existed.' These early markets were cash or "spot" markets where producers
brought their goods to sell to purchasers and the negotiations for and the sale
and transfer of the goods took place "on the spot". The commodities
markets which we know today bear little resemblance to this early version2
but have come to be seen as a "forum for investors",3 with commodities
futures contracts4 and commodities option contracts6 as investment devices.
This widespread use of commodities futures and option contracts has
been a relatively recent development 6 and, not surprisingly, the vast growth
has resulted in abuse, fraud, mismanagement and ignorance of the risks
involved in the business. Efforts have been made by both federal and state
agencies, legislatures, and courts as well as by the commodities exchanges to
* The assistance provided by George J. Sotos of the law firm of Moses, Gibbons,
Abramson and Fox of Chicago, Illinois in the development of this article is acknowl-
edged with gratitude.
1. S. KROLL & I. SHISKO, THE COMMODITIES FuTuREs GumE 3 (1970) [hereinaf-
ter cited as KROLL & SHISKO]. See also S. REP. No. 93-1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11-15
(1974).
2. The exception to this is what is known as a farmer's market in this country,
where farmers actually bring their produce to a central market location for sale on the
spot to consumers. See generally L. BELVEAL, COMMODITY SPECULATION WITH PROFITS
[N MirN 13 (1967) [hereinafter cited as BELVEAL].
3. The congressional reports relating to the CFTCA use the term "investor" when
discussing hedgers and speculators who trade on the commodity exchange. It is not an
accurate term to use in this context. The term investment has developed an accepted
meaning in the business world. In its simplest terms it contemplates an investor who
lends his money to others for their use. He anticipates a return of the principle loaned
and a profit earned as a result of their efforts. Such transactions occur most often in
corporate stocks, bonds and securities. In commodities transactions any profit earned is
a direct result of the fundamental principles of supply and demand which determine the
basic market value of the commodity underlying the contract which the commodity
trader buys or sells. Interview with George J. Sotos of the firm of Moses, Gibbons,
Abramson and Fox, Chicago, Illinois, Nov. 12, 1975.
4. "Futures contracts" or "futures" are contracts for the purchase and sale of
commodities for delivery at a time in the future on an organized exchange and subject to
the terms and conditions of the particular exchange.
5. The "commodity option contract" is "an indirect method of trading in commod-
ities futures . . . that ... gives the purchaser the option to buy or sell a specific futures
contract at a stipulated price for a given time span." Note, Federal Legislation for
Commodity Option Trading: A Proposal, 47 So. CAL. L. REv. 1418, 1422 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Federal Legislation: A Proposal].
6. Johnson, The Changing Face of Commodity Regulation, 20 PRAc. LAw. 27,
37 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Commodity Regulation].
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prevent such abuses. 7  For many reasons these efforts have not been
entirely successful.
After intensive hearings, debates, discussion and compromise, a new
and comprehensive effort to attack these past abuses and to prevent new
ones has been launched in the form of the Commodities Futures Trading
Commission Act of 1974.8 The Act promises to have a massive impact on
the commodities industry, the heart of which is at the Chicago Board of
Trade.9 It is clear that the Act vests regulation of futures trading, futures
markets, commodity futures accounts and agreements (including options)
and leverage contracts for gold and silver bullion and coins in the newly
created Commodities Futures Trading Commission, 0 thereby vastly expand-
ing the scope of regulation which previously existed under the Commodities
Exchange Act. 1 Certain aspects of the Commodities Futures Trading
Commission Act give rise to new concerns. There may be some jurisdiction-
al conflict between the Commodities Futures Trading Commission and the
Securities and Exchange Commission. The provisions in the Act for new
remedies which are to be available to injured commodities traders pose a
potentially confusing forum problem for litigants. The failure of the Act to
provide a specific private damages action in the federal courts for violations
of its provisions compounds both of these problems.
This article will outline the history of the development of the commodi-
ties markets, the attempts to regulate the transactions which occur on the
markets and the functions of the market in the business world. The new Act
will be reviewed and the problems which it presents will be discussed.
Finally, -the state of commodities law in the Seventh Circuit will be analyzed
and the probable impact on that law of the Commodities Future Trading
Commission Act will be considered.
THE FUNCTIONS AND FUNCTIONING OF THE COMMODITY MARKETS
Trading in the commodities markets has become an important part of
the economy of this country. 12  The futures markets now perform essential
7. See discussion following note 32 infra.
8. 7 U.S.C.A. § 4a (Supp. I Feb. 1975).
9. Commodity Regulation, supra note 6, at 27. Johnson states therein:
By one popular measure, the dollar value of the items traded, it is a half-
trillion-dollar business. By the same standard, the largest exchange in the
world is not on Wall Street, but in Chicago, where the Board of Trade, accord-
ing to its 1973 annual report, consummated in that year transactions with an
estimated worth of approximately $270 billion.
10. 7 U.S.C.A. § 4a (Supp. I Feb. 1975).
11. Under the Commodities Exchange Act before 1974 many commodities were
totally unregulated and option contracts were not within the scope of the Act.
12. Active commodity exchanges operate in Chicago (Chicago Board of Trade,
Chicago Mercantile Exchange, MidAmerica Commodity Exchange); Kansas City (The
Board of Trade of Kansas City); Minneapolis (Minneapolis Grain Exchange); New
York (Citrus Associates of the New York Cotton Exchange, Inc., New York Cotton
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functions for agricultural producers, manufacturers, exporters, consumers,
users of the products of agricultural commodities, participants in the invest-
ment community and others.' 3 This vital role will no doubt continue to
expand.14 As noted above, 15 commodities markets began as a place to sell
the agricultural products produced by the farmer to consumers. As indus-
trialization swept the nation, farmers were required to increase their rate of
production to meet the needs of city dwellers. This meant that the
individual farmer took to market vastly larger quantities of produce. If the
farmer over-estimated demand for his goods or arrived at the market after
the demand had been met, he could be left with a surplus of produce or be
forced to sell at a lower price than he had expected. The farmer took all the
risks. 6
To minimize these risks the producers of commodities developed the
concept of offering to sell contracts to deliver a specified quantity of a
commodity at a designated place within a specified period of time at a price
agreed upon in advance. 17 Such contracts were the forerunners of futures,
the economic function of which now is "to provide price protection to persons
dealing in the actual commodity or related products."' 8
This innovation put the risk of price fluctuations on the buyer of such a
contract, usually a businessman, such as a grain elevator operator, who
stocked large quantities of a particular commodity for business operations.
These buyers and other traders who wished to protect themselves developed
a way to minimize their risks-a devaluation of their inventory or sharp
increase in the price of a raw material-by a process known as "hedging". In
essence, hedging is a process in which the businessman uses the sale or
purchase-or both the sale and purchase-of commodities futures to set a
given price at which he can sell his commodity or buy a raw material at a
future date.' 9 This allows him to predict more accurately what future costs
will be and to operate his business more efficiently.
Exchange, New York Mercantile Exchange, Wool Associates of the New York Cotton
Exchange, Inc.); and San Francisco (Pacific Commodities Exchange, Inc.) S. REP. No.
93-1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 97 (1974). See also note 3 supra.
13. Statement by Senator Talmadge on Consideration of the Conference Report on
H.R. 13113, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (Oct. 10, 1974).
14. It is estimated that by 1974, the volume of commodities futures trading had
exceeded the $500 billion mark, a value which exceeds that of securities trading on all
the stock exchanges in the nation. See S. REP. No. 92-1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19
(1974).
15. See discussion following note 1 supra.
16. KROLL & SHISKO, supra note 1, at 4.
17. Id. at 6-8.
18. Commodity Regulation, supra note 6, at 29.
19. An example of a hedging transaction is described in Commodity Regulation,
supra note 6, at 30. A manufacturer needs certain raw material for production in June
but does not want to buy it now. But the cost of the material now is relatively low and
if he waits until the production date to buy he will face a possible increase in the price of
the material. If he acquires a "long" futures contract to accept delivery of the material
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The speculator, as opposed to the hedger, has no real interest in the
underlying commodity which is being traded on the commodities market. He
puts his capital in the commodities market in anticipation of reaping a profit
on the basis of his knowledge of when prices will rise and fall. In essence,
the speculator voluntarily takes on the risk which the hedger is seeking to
avoid. 20
The most common method of trading is to "assume a direct position in a
futures contract."'2 1  In this type of transaction a trader believes that the
price of a particular commodity will rise, for example, in the next six months.
He places an order through his broker to buy a specified quantity of the
commodity at the current market price for delivery six months hence. If a
seller, who believes the price for that commodity will drop during the same
period, can be found, the transaction will take place. The buyer has
promised to buy a specified quantity of the commodity at a given price and
the seller has agreed to deliver that quantity at that price at the time stated.
The buyer is now said to be "long" and the seller "short" the commodity.
if, in six months, the price has risen, the buyer will have his commodity at
the lower price and can realize a profit by selling at the current market
price 22 and the seller will have locked in his profi-t or minimized his antici-
pated loss.
Fewer than one percent of commodities futures contracts are settled,
however, by actual physical delivery of the commodity underlying the
contract.2 3  To meet his obligation to accept delivery2 4 the trader may
make a trade which offsets the original trade.25  If the trader who takes a
in June he can determine the cost of the material with a good degree of accuracy. If
there is a futures contract in the end product which the manufacturer produces he may
acquire a "short" futures contract to make delivery of the product. In both cases he has
established a definite future price. The value of the manufacturer's futures contract
varies with the price of the subject of the contract on the "spot" market. Thus, he can
continue to buy his materials as he needs them and offset the futures contracts. The
increased cost of raw materials should be roughly equal to the profit he receives from
offsetting the futures and the manufacturer has successfully insulated himself from
drastic price increases. For the definition of hedging promulgated by the CFTC, see
CFTC Reg. § 1.3(z), 40 Fed. Reg. 11560 (1975).
20. See generally Commodity Regulation, supra note 6, at 31; and Note, Abuses in
the Commodity Markets: Some Suggestions for Control, 25 SYRACUSE L. REv. 788, 790-
91 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Abuses in the Commodity Markets].
21. Federal Legislation: A Proposal, supa note 5, at 1420.
22. Trades are couched in terms of contracts, the terms of which, except for price,
are standarized by exchange rules. These rules will specify for each contract the
quantity of the commodity involved, its quality or grade, the location where delivery is to
be made and the month in which the delivery is due. On the Chicago Board of Trade a
July corn futures is an agreement to deliver 5,000 bushels of No. 2 yellow corn in
Chicago during the month of July. Commodity Regulation, supra note 6, at 28-29.
23. Federal Legislation: A Proposal, supra note 5, at 1421.
24. The futures contract creates commitments on the part of the buyer to accept
delivery of and pay for the commodity at the time of delivery and on the part of the
seller to deliver the commodity. See BELVEAL, supra note 2, at 33-34.
25. Commodity Regulation, supra note 6, at 28-29.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
long position (the buyer of the contract who will accept the goods) in July
corn wishes to offset the position he then assumes a short position (sells a
futures contract) in July corn at a different price, thereby ending his
contractual obligations by entering into an identical but opposite transac-
tion.2 6  Since payment is not due in a futures trade until delivery is made,
there is a risk that the parties to the contract will not perform. Thus, both
parties are required to provide a margin, which is in the nature of a
performance bond.27  The parties may be called upon to provide additional
margin as the market price of the commodity involved fluctuates. 28
The requirement of margin 29 is the reason for the development of
another method of risk-shifting, the commodity option contract. The neces-
sity for putting up margin means that the trader must be ready to produce
more capital or sell out his futures in the event of price fluctuations. Many
traders were not willing to take this risk. A person who trades in commodity
options pays a nonreturnable premium30 to an underwriter (one who issues
commodity options). In turn that person gets the option to buy or sell the
specific futures contract at a stipulated price for a given time period. He
can either exercise his option within the time given or let the option lapse.
Since there is no commitment on the part of the trader in an option contract
to buy or sell, no margin is required. Thus, there is no risk of margin calls
and the resulting increased demand for capital. 31  If the market does not
move as predicted, the option trader need not exercise his option and has
limited his loss to the amount of the premium paid for the option.
26. For instance, if a buyer ("long") acquires a futures contract at $2 per
bushel and thereafter the worth of that contract increases to $2.50, he will have
a gain of about 50 cents per bushel. When he 'offsets' by selling a new con-
tract at $2.50, it is as if he had taken delivery at the original contract price
of $2 and re-sold at the current value of $2.50.
Id. at 29.
27. ld. at 32. The description of margin as a performance bond is somewhat
simplistic. Margin originated as a performance bond when the concept of futures
contracts first developed. Now, margin is intimately connected with the relationship
between the clearinghouses and their members. [For a brief discussion of the functions
of clearinghouses, see S. REP. No. 93-1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17 (1974).] All
members of a clearinghouse are required to deposit "maintenance" to provide a cushion
against price fluctuations, to work as a performance bond and to secure the member
firm's transactions. The firm in turn requires that its customers provide a similar
cushion which is called a margin. Commodity Regulation, supra note 6, at 32.
28. Federal Legislation: A Proposal, supra note 5, at 1425. However, it should be
pointed out that margin need not always be provided in the form of cash. If there is
open equity in a customer's account, e.g. profits in contracts held in the account,
additional margin may not be required.
29. A margin call comes about automatically because of a deteriorated equity
situation in the customer's account. When the equity in his account falls below the
margin required by the broker, the customer is "called" to provide the additional capital
or other equity necessary to meet these requirements. Id.
30. The price of the premium is determined by the price of the underlying
commodity, the historical price volatility of the commodity and the length of the option
term, among other factors. See KROLL & SHISKO, supra note 1, at 259.
31. Id.at258.
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The commodity exchanges now provide a regulated forum upon which
commodities transactions such as those described above can take place.
Their development has kept pace with the needs of commodities futures
traders and consumers, so that they now represent a major economic force in
our nation. The growth from the days of the spot markets to the modern
exchange occurred relatively rapidly and relatively recently. The sudden-
ness of the growth and the very size of the current operation has of course
led to certain types of problems.
THE HISTORY OF REGULATION OF THE COMMODITIES MARKETS
The need for regulation of commodity trading markets and the develop-
ment of regulation schemes was initially determined and then influenced by
the way the trading industry grew and by the techniques utilized to effect the
trades on individual exchanges. 32 Regulation began as a way to protect the
farm interests-specifically, futures contracts in grains. The Grain Futures
Act of 192233 resulted from the belief that the farmers who produced the
grain were not realizing the profits to which they were entitled because the
speculators in grain futures were reaping large profits at the expense of the
farmers.3 4 The 1922 Act required the licensing of grain markets and made
trading through anyone not a member of a licensed market an unlawful act.
Regulations defining the requirements for becoming a licensed market were
provided and rules were developed to prevent certain abuses. The Act was
to be administered by the Secretary of Agriculture.
As a response to the economic upheavals that the country experienced
between 1922 and 1933, Congress enacted the Securities Act of 193335 and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.36 These measures provided protection
for investors who, as a group, had suffered remarkably during those years.
Some of this sentiment for the investor carried over to 1936 when Congress
considered amendments to the Grain Futures Act.
The result of these considerations, the Commodity Exchange Act,37
marked the beginning of the recognition that commodities trading was
32. See discussion following note 1 supra.
33. The Act in its present form appears at 7 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). See Board of
Trade of the City of Chicago v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1 (1923).
34. A similar comment relating to the current situation of consumers was voiced
recently by Senator George McGovern when he introduced S. 2578, 93d Cong., Ist Sess.
(1973):
The people's interests in commodity trading transcends the orderly functioning
of those markets and the prevention of outright fraud. For every time a specu-
lator turns an unreasonable profit by trading futures, the housewife and the
customer pay the price. And since it is the speculator, not the producer who
received the windfall profit, the higher wholesale and retail prices do not act
as a stimulant to production.
35. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a et. seq. (1970).
36. 15 U.S.C. §§ 74a et. seq. (1970).
37. 7 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
developing into an integral part of the investments business. 38 The relation-
ship between broker and customer was regulated under the Act so that
customer funds would be segregated from those of the broker and held in
trust for the customer.39 New licensing requirements were enacted 40 and the
definition of a contract market which could be licensed was liberalized.4 1
Although the Act clearly recognized a changing role in commodities trading,
it made no attempt to regulate anything but agricultural products and was
still administered by the Secretary of Agriculture. 42  A Commodity Ex-
change Commission was created to oversee the regulation and had the power
to set limits on trading for "speculators" but not for farm or food interests
engaged in hedging.43
Numerous amendments were enacted between 1936 and 1968, but it
was not until 1968 that major changes were made in the Commodity
Exchange Act. In the 1968 provisions, the customer was further protected
and it became possible for new market participants to be licensed. In
addition, the anti-fraud provision which had been enacted in the 1936 Act
was expanded, 44 provision was made for setting minimum financial require-
ments for the various markets, and the regulatory ability of the Commission
was strengthened, 45 New commodities were also added to those regulated
by the Commodity Exchange Commission. 46  Clearly, even in 1968, the
focus of the federal legislation was agricultural and although it provided
some protection for both producers and investors, there were entire phases of
the commodities futures industry which remained untouched by any federal
regulatory standards. 47
For this reason state regulatory agencies, legislatures and the judiciary
attempted to step into the gap to prevent some of the abuses which were
38. P. Johnson, The Perimeters of Regulatory Jurisdiction Under the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission Act 4 (Unpublished paper to be published in 25 DRAKE L.
REV. (Fall, 1975) [hereinafter cited as Perimeters].
39. 7 U.S.C. § 6d (1970).
40. 7 U.S.C. §§ 6d, 6e (1970).
41. 7 U.S.C. § 7a (1970).
42. Perimeters, supra note 38, at 5.
43. 7 U.S.C. § 6a (1970).
44. 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1970).
45. Perimeters, supra note 38, at 6.
46. Thus, by 1968, regulated commodities included wheat, cotton, rice, corn, oats,
barley, rye, flaxseed, grain, sorghums, mill feeds, butter, eggs, Irish potatoes, wool, wool
tops, fats and oils, cottonseed meal, cottonseed, peanuts, soybeans, soybean meal,
livestock, livestock products and frozen concentrated orange juice. See 7 U.S.C. § 2
(1970). But, it should be noted that trading was occurring in commodities which were
not regulated under the Act. These included, cocoa, coffee, copper, foreign currency,
iced broilers, lumber, mercury, platinum, plywood, propane gas, silver, sugar and silver
coins. S. REP. No. 93-1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 94 (1974).
47. As pointed out in note 46 supra, in 1968 only certain designated commodities
were directly regulated under the Commodities Exchange Act. Although 7 U.S.C. § 6c
of the Act prohibited options trading, that prohibition was only applicable to regulated
commodities. In addition, commodity option underwriters were not regulated under the
Act, because their function was, of course, prohibited.
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developing. The efforts of these agencies has been intensified since 1971
when the trading of "naked" commodity options 48 began to develop as a
meaningful segment of the commodities industry. 49 The main thrust of the
attempts made by such agencies to exert some control over the otherwise
unregulated aspects of commodities trading was to define the commodity
option as a security. If that could be done, the unregulated trading could
then be brought within the purview of state securities laws (Blue Sky Laws).
Relying in most cases on the "risk capital" test50 of determining whether a
transaction comes within the regulatory purpose of the securities laws, many
state courts did find that the commodity options 5 ' were securities under their
Blue Sky laws.5 2  Some states have approached the same problem through
administrative and legislative channels with similar results.55
The year 1967 marked the first break in the sharp distinction made by
federal courts between securities and commodities. In Maheu v. Reynolds
& Co.54 a New York federal district court found that a discretionary account
in commodities opened by the plaintiffs with the defendant was an "invest-
ment contract" and therefore within the definition of a security under federal
law. 55 Other cases followed the reasoning of Maheu and came to the same
48. "Naked" commodity options are options which are not backed by a physical
stock of the underlying commodity or by a contract to buy such a stock.
49. See Federal Legislation: A Proposal, supra note 5, at 1426. This article
summarizes the experience of Goldstein-Samuelson, Inc., a corporation formed to sell
commodity options on a large scale. The firm was formed in 1971 and did a $1,000,000
business in option sales that year. By the end of 1972 the gross income of the firm had
reached $45,000,000. The success of the firm prompted others to enter the business and
by 1973 the sales of commodity options in California had reached $200-300 million per
year. The success was short-lived, however, as Goldstein-Samuelson was put into
involuntary receivership in 1973 and trading of commodity options was stopped in
California. Other states soon followed suit. Id. at 1426-29.
50. The "risk capital" test is a modification of the Howey test and was designed to
broaden the scope of the definition of an investment contract. The emphasis in the test
is that even though the investor looks like a participant in the business venture involved,
it is clear that he is actually providing the initial risk capital being used in the offeror's
business. See Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906
(1961).
For a discussion of the various tests used and one analysis which urges a combina-
tion of the risk capital test and the Howey test, see Coffey, The Economic Realities of a
'Security': Is There a More Meaningful Formula?", 18 W. RES. L. REv 367 (1967).
51. It has been suggested that the argument that commodity options are securities
can be logically justified in the case of naked commodity options but that the argument
won't hold up in the case of options backed by a contract for the purchase of the
commodity. See Federal Legislation: A Proposal, supra note 5, at 1434-35.
52. See, e.g., Shapiro v. First Federated Commodity Trust Corp. 192 B.N.A. SEC.
REG. & L. REP. E-1 (March 7, 1963) (Cir. Ct., Baltimore Co., Md., Feb., 1973), 208
B.N.A. SEC. REG. & L. REP. A-5 (June 27, 1973) (Cir. Ct., Baltimore Co., Md., June 7,
1973); California v. Puts and Calls, Inc. 216 B.N.A. SEC. REG. & L. REP. A-18 (Aug. 22,
1973) (Cal. Super. Ct., Aug. 6, 1973).
53. See Abuses in the Commodity Markets, supra note 20, at 793, 798-99; and
Federal Legislation: A Proposal, supra note 5, at 1431.
54. 282 F. Supp. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
55. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970) for the definition of a security.
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conclusion.5 6 However, in the only court of appeals case to consider the
question, Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc.,57 a Seventh Circuit decision,
the arguments of the Maheu court were rejected. The plaintiff in Milnarik
opened a discretionary account with the defendant for trading in commodi-
ties futures5 8 and argued that the rule of Maheu and subsequent cases in
that line should be followed. In response, the court stated:
Nevertheless, we do not believe every conceivable arrangement
that would fit a dictionary definition of an investment contract was
intended to be included within the statutory definition of a security.
• . . Judicial analyses of the question whether particular invest-
ment contracts are 'securities' within the statutory definition have
repeatedly stressed the significance of finding a common enter-
prise.5 9
The Milnarik court went on to find that the essential element of commonality
was not present in this situation and that the action could not be governed by
the securities acts.
In a different approach to the problem, the court in Goodman v. H.
Hentz & Co.60 held that a violation of the Commodity Exchange Act could
be a tort "for which plaintiffs, as members of the class Congress sought to
protect from the type of harm they allege here, have a federal civil remedy
even in the absence of specific mention of a civil remedy in the Commodity
Exchange Act." 61  The plaintiffs alleged that they were defrauded by
defendants while investing in commodities regulated under the Commodities
Exchange Act, in violation of Section 6b 62 of the Act, which makes it
unlawful for an employee of a commodity market to defraud a customer.
The Eighth Circuit in Booth v. Peavey Co. Commodity Services68 also
held that a civil remedy existed under the anti-fraud provision of the
Commodities Exchange Act 64 or under the securities laws. The charge by
plaintiff in this case was that the broker-dealer was churning65 his commodi-
ty account. The opinion is not a strong one because a directed verdict for
56. Berman v. Orimex Trading, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); SEC v.
North American Trading Co., 230 B.N.A. SEc. REG. & L. REp. A-14 (Dec. 5, 1973)(N.D. Ill. Nov. 14, 1973) (by implication); Marshall v. Lamson Bros. & Co., 368 F.
Supp. 486 (S.D. Ia. 1974).
57. 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir. 1972).
58. Id. at 275.
59. Id. at 276.
60. 265 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
61. Id. at 447.
62. 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1970).
63. 430 F.2d 132 (8th Cir. 1970).
64. 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1970).
65. In general 'churning' signifies in the securities business the practice by a
broker of advancing his own interest (his commissions based on trading vol-
ume) without regard to his customer's objective by a course of trading which
is excessive in light of the size and character of the customer's account.
Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1040 n.1 (7th Cir. 1974).
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the defendant was affirmed and the analysis of the basis of the cause of
action was not stringent.
In Deaktor v. Schreiber & Co.,6 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
approved the result in both Goodman and Booth, finding that although no
express provision is contained in the Commodities Exchange Act for private
damage actions they should be maintainable.6" The court further noted that
their conclusion appeared to be uniformly accepted.6
By 1973 the Securities and Exchange Commission had stepped out of
the shadows and had begun to take a more active role in attempting to police
certain aspects of the commodities industry. 69 Typical of this action,
perhaps, are cases where investigations were undertaken by the SEC of firms
which were not registered with the SEC and engaged solely in commodities
trading.7 0 In such cases the courts held that the Commission was not
required to establish its jurisdiction by showing that the companies were
engaging in commodities transactions which met the definition of a security
under the Securities Acts. During this same period of time the SEC began
to issue releases which indicated that certain types of arrangements, not
previously regulated by the Securities Acts, were considered investment
contracts. 71 Some courts found such indications of expanding SEC jurisdic-
tion persuasive in the argument that certain types of contractual arrange-
ments in the commodities field were investment contracts. 72  It was clear,
however, that these actions by the SEC and other attempts to regulate
commodities through access to securities laws was not a satisfactory answer
to the problem of abuses in the industry.7
3
Another attempted method of control of the abuses in the commodities
markets is the most enduring one-self-regulation by the exchanges them-
66. 479 F.2d 529 (7th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 414 U.S. 113 (1973).
67. Id. at 534.
68. Id.
69. See Abuses in the Commodity Markets, supra note 20, at 802; and Federal
Legislation: A Proposal, supra note 5, at 1430.
70. See, e.g., W.J. Abbott & Co. v. SEC, 276 F. Supp. 502 (W.D. Pa. 1967); SEC
v. Savage, 513 F.2d 188 (7th Cir. 1975).
71. See, e.g., SEC Securities Act Release No. 5347 (Jan. 4, 1973), reported in
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1049 (condominium purchase/agreements); SEC Securities
Act Release No. 5018 (Nov. 13, 1969), reported in [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEc. L. REP. I 17,757 (whiskey warehouse receipts).
72. See, e.g., Marshall v. Lamson Bros. & Co., 368 F. Supp. 486, 490 (S.D. Ia.
1974).
73. See Abuses in the Commodity Markets, supra note 20, at 812. The movement
by the SEC was halting and limited by the necessity of finding ways to bring commodi-
ties trading within the definition of a security. The SEC was established to regulate the
securities industry and while strong similarities exist between that industry and the
commodities industry, there are also significant differences. The SEC was equipped with
neither the manpower, the expertise nor the procedural avenues for adequate access to
the commodities industry which would have been necessary to adequately regulate the
industry.
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selves. Since the organized exchanges began operating they have adopted
and enforced a "code of business ethics" 74 and the private law which
governs the conduct of exchange members is a major part of the operation of
any exchange.75 These attempts at self-regulation reflect a recognition on
the part of the futures industry that public confidence is a vital element in
their success. Such regulation has not been totally effective, as is evidenced
by the abuses which have developed in the markets. In addition, as courts
have been increasingly prone to permit the possibility of private rights of
action based on such rules,76 exchanges have grown increasingly wary of
expanding regulatory efforts.
77
This historical background illuminates the reason that the federal
government embarked on the arduous process of enacting a comprehensive
regulatory act for the commodities industry. The mechanics of trading in
the commodity markets worked relatively well. As long as the markets were
frequented by sophisticated businessmen who were trading commodities as a
way of operating a more efficient business, the self-regulation by the
individual exchanges and the minimal supervision by the Department of
Agriculture were adequate measures of control. It was not until trading in
commodities futures became viewed as a substitute for trading on the stock
market that the industry began to experience serious difficulties in regulating
abuses. By the early 1970's it had become imperative that every phase of
the commodities futures trading industry be subjected to rigorous review and
more efficient and stringent regulation. The legislators who undertook the
task recognized the sources of the problem and proposed a comprehensive
solution. 78
74. Commodity Regulation, supra note 6, at 33.
75. Id.
76. See discussion following note 169 infra.
77. Commodity Regulation, supra note 6, at 33-34.
78. The Senate Committee which considered the proposals for regulation of the
commodities industry, summarized the need as follows:
The shift to market oriented economy has brought the general public into
the futures markets in growing numbers. Speculators are attracted to the fu-
tures markets by the wide price swings and the possibility of large profits.
Such an increase in trading by the speculative public, while useful to hedgers,
brings with it potential market problems. If individual speculators or groups
operating in concert obtain control of the futures markets, price manipulations,
corners and squeezes can occur, with adverse effects on producers and consum-
ers alike.
In recent years, the consumer has become increasingly aware that futures
markets have a direct effect on such matters as his grocery bill and the cost
of his home. Properly operating futures markets help to hold down consumer
prices by reducing middleman costs. However, improperly operating futures
markets can have the opposite result. In order to assure that the futures mar-
kets operate properly and that the prices consumers pay are not artificially
high, careful and efficient supervision of the market is essential.
It is apparent that a regulatory agency cannot be expected to oversee the
rapidly expanding and complex futures markets without additional tools with
which to do the job and proper organization and funding. In addition to pro-
viding the tools that the regulatory body would need in preventing violations
and disciplining violators directly, its role in supervising exchanges must be
NOTES AND COMMENTS
THE COMMODITIES FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION ACT OF 1974
The Commodities Futures Trading Commission Act of 197479 amends
and makes additions to the Commodity Exchange Act. The changes
introduced by the Act are expansive. The scope of regulation encompasses
every aspect of the industry, from the definition of a commodity to the
provision for the formation of a national commodities futures trading associa-
tion. Of particular interest to anyone involved in the commodities industry
are both the establishment of an independent commission with comprehensive
regulatory powers and the emphasis on protecting the commodities customer.
The Provisions of the CFTCA
A five member Commodities Futures Trading Commission, similar in
status to the Securities and Exchange Commission, was established in title I
of the Act.80 All authority which previously was vested in the Secretary of
Agriculture and the Commodity Exchange Commission will now reside in the
CFTC, which has additional powers. In title II the Commission is given
wide latitude in its authority to regulate futures trading and exchange
activities. A major addition to the Commodity Exchange Act and the scope
of the Commission's power is the new definition of commodities, which adds
a catch-all phrase to ithe listed regulated commodities: "and all other goods
and articles . . .and all services, rights and interests in which contracts for
future delivery are presently or in the future dealt with."'81
There are several aspects of the Act which emphasize the power of the
Commission in various phases of its regulatory capacity. These include: (1)
the authority of the Commission to review by-laws, rules, regulations and
resolutions of contract markets;8 2 (2) the power to assess a civil penalty
against a contract market or certain individuals for failure to enforce its rules
of government or for other violations of the Act;83 (3) the power to bring an
action for an injunction to enjoin acts prohibited by the law or to enforce
compliance with the law;8 4 (4) the power to review exchange decisions
substantially expanded. Unquestionably, exchanges are going to have to per-
form their regulatory role better in order to provide a viable market in which
the public can have confidence. The federal regulatory agency must be given
the authority to require that exchanges do so.
S. REP. No. 93-1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17 (1974).
79. 7 U.S.C.A. § 2 et seq. (Supp. I Feb. 1975) '[hereinafter referred to as CFTCA
or Act].
80. 7 U.S.C.A. § 4a (Supp. I Feb. 1975).
81. This addition was made in response to new proposed futures trading in
plywood, shipping space and mortgages as well as other commodities which may be
proposed for trading on contract markets. See Commodity Regulation, supra note 6, at
37.
82. 7 U.S.C.A. § 7a(12) (Supp. I Feb. 1975).
83. 7 U.S.C.A. § 13a (Supp. I Feb. 1975).
84. 7 U.S.C.A. § 13a-1 (Supp. I Feb. 1975).
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regarding disciplinary action or denial of access to an exchange;85 (5) the
provision in the Act for a reparations procedure;8 6 (6) the authorization by
Congress for the Commission to conduct investigations of various aspects of
the industry8 7 and to initiate research into more efficient and more modem
trading techniques;88 and (7) the authority of the Commission to permit,
deny or suspend registration to an association as a registered futures
association under the Act.89
Title IV contains the so-called housekeeping provisions of the Act,
providing for penalties and criminal prosecution in the event that a Commis-
sioner or employee of the Commission participates in transactions in com-
modities futures or options or gives out information on such transactions.9"
This title provides that the ban on options trading in the previously regulated
commodities will continue, but options trading in newly regulated com-
modities will be permitted unless banned by the Commission.9' The
Commission is also authorized to conduct research and studies and to make
reports to Congress on the state of the industry. 92 Title III provides for the
possibility of the formation of "national futures associations", 93 which could,
perhaps, function in ways similar to the manner in which the National As-
sociation of Securities Dealers operates.
The measures described above, in addition to other provisions of the
Act, are designed to protect each phase of the futures trading process-the
mechanics of the industry. There was much emphasis in the committee
hearings and reports on protection of members of the general public who
have begun to invest in the commodities markets in large numbers in
anticipation of large profits. 94 Therefore, while all of the Act's provisions
will help protect the brokerage house customer directly or indirectly, new
provisions for their protection are available under the CFTCA. Noteworthy
among these are the provisions for ongoing research and informational
85. 7 U.S.C.A. § 12c (Supp. I Feb. 1975).
86. 7 U.S.C.A. § 18 (Supp. I Feb. 1975).
87. 7 U.S.C.A. § 20 (Supp. IFeb. 1975).
88. 7 U.S.C.A. § 22 (Supp. I Feb. 1975).
89. 7 U S.C.A. § 21 (Supp. I Feb. 1975).
90. 7 U.S.C.A. § 13(e) (Supp. IFeb. 1975).
91. 7 U.S.C.A. § 6c(a) (3) (B) (Supp. I Feb. 1975).
92. 7 U.S.C.A. § 22 (Supp. I Feb. 1975).
93. 7 U.S.C.A. § 21(a) (Supp. I Feb. 1975).
94. The popularity of commodity investments is due in large part to the lure of
large profits with relatively little initial capital outlay. In a commodities futures
transaction, by putting $5,000 into futures contracts with a commodities broker the
customer can control, for example, $50,000 worth of futures. A similar amount of
money put in a margin account with a stockbroker controls only about $10,000 worth of
stock. See Federal Legislation: A Proposal, supra note 5, at 1428. What many of these
investors appear not to recognize is that the system also works in reverse. The degree of
leverage is the same whether the price of the commodity goes up or down. One can earn
much more than he puts in but can likewise lose a lot more than he put in and even more
than he has.
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programs to modernize the industry and educate and inform the public,95
the reparations procedure, 96 and the requirement that contract markets are
to provide an "equitable procedure through arbitration or otherwise for the
settlement of customers' claims and grievances. ' 97
While the provision for the development of materials for the education
of producers, market users and the general public is a relatively minor
provision of the Act, it is to be hoped that vigorous use will be made of it by
the Commission. There is much confusion and misconception about the
commodities business9" which has resulted in uninformed speculation by
many people. Their ignorance, especially when combined with the less than
scrupulous business practices of some firms, has often resulted in unnecessar-
ily large financial loss. 99 A concerted effort on the part of the Commission
and of the established commodity firms to educate the public (and the
employees of the firms) as to the risks involved, the mechanics of the
market, and their responsibilities therein will certainly have an impact in
reducing the number of people who suffer substantial losses in the trading of
commodity futures.
The requirement that contract markets provide arbitration procedures
for settlement of customer claims is certainly not a new concept,10 0 but
perhaps the requirement of its availability will refine the procedures current-
ly in use and make the procedure more effective. The Act makes the use of
such a procedure voluntary by the customer and limits its applicability to
claims under $15,000. An effective internal procedure of this sort would
help resolve the majority of customer claims against brokers.
While the arbitration procedure is limited in its availability to custom-
ers, there is no such limitation in the reparations procedure added by section
106 of the Act.10 1 The procedure is initiated by the filing of a petition
within two years after a cause of action accrues by any person who
complains of a violation of any provision of the Act or rules, regulations or
orders promulgated thereunder. 10 2 The Commission will forward the claim
95. 7 U.S.C.A. § 22 (Supp. I Feb. 1975).
96. 7'U.S.C.A. § 18 (Supp. I Feb. 1975).
97. 7 U.S.C.A. § 7a(ll) (Supp. I Feb. 1975). A similar requirement is made of
"associations of persons" who wish to be registered as a "registered futures association"
under the Act. See 7 'U.S.C.A. § 21(a) (Supp. I Feb. 1975). An association may not
be registered unless the Commission finds there is a procedure for settling claims and
grievances of customers which do not exceed $5,000. 7 U.S.C.A. § 21(b)(10) (Supp. I
Feb. 1975).
98. Commodity Regulation, supra note 6, at 27.
99. See Federal Legislation: A Proposal, supra note 5, at 1426-29 for a discussion
of one such example, the experience with Goldstein-Samuelson, Inc.
100. Such procedures are now available on securities exchanges and on some of the
commodities exchanges.
101. 7 U.S.C.A. § 18 (Supp. I Feb. 1975).
102. 7 U.S.C.A. § 18(a) (Supp. IFeb. 1975).
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to the respondent for a response if such action is deemed appropriate.10 3
Where the amount contested is in excess of $2,500104 and the Commission
believes reasonable grounds exist therefor, an investigation may be conduct-
ed and a hearing held before an Administrative Law Judge. 10 5  After such
a hearing (or on the basis of sworn statements if no hearing is held), 10 if
the Commission determines that the respondent has violated any of the Act's
provisions or the rules, regulations and orders issued pursuant thereto, the
Commission shall determine the damage the complainant is entitled to and
order payment of that sum by the respondent.' 07 The Commission's order
may be enforced in the event of non-payment by the filing within two years
of a certified copy of the order in a federal district court.10 8  All orders of
the Commission are appealable to the United States Court of Appeals. 10 9
Provisions are also made for penalties against a non-complying registrant in
the form of prohibition of trading and a suspension of registration.' 10
Problems Raised by the CFTCA
Manifestly, the CFTCA provides extensive particularized regulation of
the mechanics of the trading process on commodities exchanges. Many of
the weaknesses in the old regulatory system have been corrected. There
are, as there must be with any legislation, aspects of regulatory procedure yet
to be worked out with time and experience. For litigants in the commodity
field, two areas of concern remain somewhat indeterminate. First, there
may be some circumstances in which the jurisdiction of the CFTC conflicts
or is confused with that of the SEC. The second problem area is one which
will confront the customer who has been defrauded in the commodity market
or alleges other violations of the regulatory laws-where he should bring his
action.
The jurisdictional question was a troublesome one,"' which was not
ultimately resolved until the final version of the bill was hammered out in
103. Id.
104. If the amount is less than $2500, the hearing procedure may be dispensed with
and a determination made on the basis of depositions or verified fact statements.
105. 7 U.S.C.A. § 18(b) (Supp. I Feb. 1975). Provision is made elsewhere in the
Act for the Commission to employ Administrative Law Judges (as well as other
employees) necessary for the proper performance of its duties. 7 U.S.C.A. § 16 (Supp. I
Feb. 1975).
106. 7 U.S.C.A. § 18(a) (Supp. IFeb. 1975).
107. 7 U.S.C.A. § 18(e) (Supp. I Feb. 1975). A similar order may be entered by
the Commission where the respondent admits to a portion of the liability claimed against
him. The order may be entered as to the undisputed amount.
108. 7 U.S.C.A. § 18(f) (Supp. I Feb. 1975).
109. 7 U.S.C.A. § 18(g) (Supp. I Feb. 1975). The procedure for appeal is set out
in 7 U.S.C.A. § 9 (Supp. I Feb. 1975) and states that the Commission's finding of fact
shall be conclusive, if supported by the weight of the evidence.
110. 7 U.S.C.A. § 13a (Supp. I Feb. 1975).
111. Perimeters, supra note 38.
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the conference committee. 21 2 The difficulty with this issue should not be
incomprehensible, given the history of the regulatory struggle.1 13  A con-
sciousness of this history is reflected in -the legislative history of the jurisdic-
tion provision, with which it is important to be acquainted.
The House bill had provided for exclusive jurisdiction of the Commis-
sion over all futures transactions but also provided that such jurisdiction
would not supersede or limit the jurisdiction of the SEC or other regulatory
authorities. 1 4  It has ,been pointed out that there were at least three
major problem areas with the House provision. First, the jurisdiction
already developed by the SEC was -to be left intact." 5 Second, the House
bill did not specifically address the problem of jurisdiction of the Commission
to regulate accounts or agreements between customer and broker, option
contracts or aspects of the futures business other than market transactions
themselves. 11 6 Finally, no mention was made of the relationship between
the Commission and state regulatory agencies."1 7
The Senate amendments to the House bill attempted to clear up these
omissions. Section 201 of the bill as proposed by the Senate provided that
the Commission's jurisdiction was to be exclusive as to all futures transac-
tions on designated contract markets. Where such jurisdiction existed it was
to supersede the jurisdiction of all other agencies, both state and federal." 8
The Senate amendment added that no provision of the Act should be
interpreted as superseding or limiting jurisdiction of state and federal
courts.1 9
112. See Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, CONF. REP.
No. 93-1383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5894,
5897.
113. See discussion following note 32 supra.
114. Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, CONF. Rm'. No.
93-1383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., (1974) 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5894, 5897.
This characteristic of the House bill appears consistent with the original House proposal
for a five person regulatory Commission made up of four public members plus the Secre-
tary of Agriculture. The Commission's public members would have served on a part
time basis and the ties of the Commission to the Department of Agriculture would have
remained strong.
115. Perimeters, supra note 38, at 9.
116. Id. at 10-11.
117. Id. at 11.
118. S. REP. No. 93-1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 20-27 (1974). The explanation
therein states:
While the Committee did wish the jurisdiction of the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission to be exclusive with regard to the trading of futures on
organized markets, it did not wish to infringe on the jurisdiction of the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission or other government agencies. Therefore, the
Committee adopted clarifying amendments to the House bill. The Committee
wished to make clear that where the jurisdiction of the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission is applicable, it supersedes State as well as Federal agen-
cies.
119. Id. This addition is interesting in light of the confusion existing in both state
and federal courts as to where their jurisdiction begins and ends.
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The Senate proposals regarding jurisdiction were adopted by the confer-
ence committee, except in one particular. 120  The conference version reject-
ed the Senate's proposal vesting the Commission with exclusive jurisdiction
only over futures transactions on a designated contract market by a member
of the market. Instead, it adopted the broader House version which vested
the CFTC with exclusive jurisdiction over all futures activities, even on
unlicensed markets. 12 '
The result of the legislation is that a clear policy was expressed by
Congress that in light of the spate of legislation, regulation and court
decisions which have proliferated in recent years, it was time to consolidate
the regulation of commodities futures transactions in one agency with
pervasive authority. 122  Thus, the Comission, under the authority of the
CFTCA and the regulations it will promulgate, will regulate every conceiv-
able sort of commodities transaction. It is expressly prohibited from acting
only in direct transactions involving financial instruments which are routinely
traded among sophisticated financial institutions. 23
The regulatory jurisdiction of the CFTC over commodities transactions
has been established. There can be no doubt concerning the breadth of its
jurisdiction in most areas of the commodities industry. The conflict or
confusion which may arise between the CFTC and the SEC will be with
respect to those dimensions of the commodities industry which have been
blurred or absorbed into the securities field. The struggle to create a cause
of action for defrauded comodities traders has, as discussed previously, led
certain courts to define some kinds of transactions in commodities as
investment contracts. But a careful reading of the legislative history of the
Act should clarify any doubt that such a construction is no longer justified.
The possibility of conflict between the SEC and the CFTC was not over-
looked in the development of the legislation as is evidenced by the following
statement:
It is not intended that the jurisdiction of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission with respect to investment contracts be super-
seded, except to the extent that jurisdiction is granted to the CFTC
with respect to contracts for future delivery or options relating...
to tangible commodities, or which are effected on a contract market
124
If such jurisdiction is granted to the CFTC, then the rationale which has
brought earlier cases under the securities laws will no longer be necessary or
applicable. Courts which heed this intent and -the additional comment that
120. See Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, CONF. REP.
No. 93-1282, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5897.
121. Id. See also Perimeters, supra note 38, at 14.
122. Perimeters, supra note 38, at 15.
123. 7 U.S.C.A. § 4a(a) (Supp. I Feb. 1975).
124. 120 CONG. REc. H10248 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1974).
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where the CFTC's jurisdiction is applicable it is to supersede both state and
federal agencies 125 must come to the conclusion that the securities laws are
no longer a necessary crutch for the maintenance of an action based on
commodities futures trades which take place on a contract market.
The second area of difficulty is not so easily resolved. The dilemma
facing an aggrieved customer in the commodities market was not clarified by
the failure of the Act to specifically deal with the availability of a private
damage action in the federal courts. With the enactment of the CFTCA
such a person has several possible avenues for a remedy. A disconcerted
customer may conceivably pursue his complaint through grievance proce-
dures provided by a contract market, 126 or a registered futures associa-
tion,' 27 the reparations procedure administered by the Commission,'128 and
presumably all judicial remedies previously existing in both state and federal
courts. 129  The new remedies provided in the Act will probably streamline
the process of righting many of the wrongs done to customers. However,
although some federal courts have determined that there is a right of action
for private damages under the Commodities Exchange Act,' 30 the CFTCA
neither denies nor confirms that such a private action exists.
One writer has observed:
Although both the House and the Senate sought to centralize
regulatory jurisdiction over futures trading in the new Commission
they did not wish to foreclose injured persons from seeking redress
in the federal and state court.
When H.R. 13313 reached the Senate Agriculture and For-
estry Committee, concern arose over whether the Commission's ex-
clusive jurisdiction would impair the right of an injured investor to
bring suit in the courts for relief. The concern was heightened by
a new provision [§ 14] in the Act authorizing the Commission to
hear investor complaints and to award damages ("reparations") .13
To meet this concern the Senate added the provision in section 2(a) which
provides that nothing therein is to supersede or limit the jurisdiction of either
federal or state courts.' 82  The writer concludes that "[I]t is clear that
125. S. REP. No. 93-1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. at 23 (1974).
126. 7 U.S.C.A. § 7a(l1) (Supp. I Feb. 1975).
127. 7 U.S.C.A. § 21(b) (10) (Supp. I Feb. 1975).
128. 7 U.S.C.A. § 18 (Supp. I Feb. 1975).
129. 7 U.S.C.A. § 4a (Supp. I Feb. 1975).
130. See discussion following note 60 supra.
131. Perimeters, supra note 38, at 16-17.
132. It is unclear why the Congress did not in this instance provide for exclusivejurisdiction of federal courts for actions brought for violations of this Act. In the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a et. seq., which set up comprehen-
sive regulation of the securities exchanges and could perhaps be considered a counterpart
of the CFTCA, exactly such a provision is made. The parallel seems obvious.
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injured persons may initiate actions in the courts and are not confined to a
proceeding before the Commission."'
While this conclusion is indisputably correct, it defeats at least part of
the very purpose Congress had in mind in consolidating regulation in one
agency. Strictly speaking, regulation of the market mechanics is absolutely
within -the Commission's jurisdiction. But the degree of control which can be
exercised by the Commission is limited by the fact that actions may be
brought by customers, as a result of breakdowns in those mechanics, in any
court which will exercise jurisdiction over the case. Had proceedings before
the Commission been made mandatory at least in certain cases and exclusive
federal jurisdiction for violation of the CFTCA been provided for, the
Commission's control would have been more effective.
In addition to this opportunity for the dilution of the CFTC's control of
the commodities industry, the failure to prescribe limits on jurisdiction gives
rise to the continuation of the problem of multiple and concurrent litigation
and administrative procedures arising from the same set of facts and
transactions. 134 It presents the plaintiff-customer with a problem of decid-
ing which forum is the appropriate one before which to seek his remedy. It
also presents the brokerage house or contract market member with the
unpalatable prospect of defending itself against attacks in the courts and
investigations by multiple supervisory agencies, including the CFTC, the
proposed national futures association and the contract market of which it is a
member. 135
The recent Supreme Court decision in Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile
Exchange1 36 will no doubt set the tone for situations where simultaneous
administrative and court actions are in progress. In that case the Court,
invoking tenets of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, held that a district
court action based on antitrust laws should be stayed until administrative
proceedings had been conducted before the Commodity Exchange Commis-
sion. In the opinion the court recognized that the expertise of the Commodi-
ty Exchange Commission would be of immense value in determining many
of the questions of fact which would be determinative of the case. 137 But
this is only a partial solution to the over-all problem. There remain the
difficulties of simultaneous state and federal court actions which cannot be
133. Perimeters, supra note 38, at 18.
134. This is one of the few areas in which state and federal actions cannot be forced
to be consolidated.
135. The brokerage house or member of a contract market is in the unenviable
position of being subject to investigation and possible penalties from the CFTC, any
exchange to which he belongs and all the sub-units and committees of these exchanges
which may have any relevant interest in supervising particular aspects of exchange
operations.
136. 409 U.S. 289 (1973)
137. Id. at 305.
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consolidated and the barrage of penalties to which the brokerage house may
be subjected until such time as the rules of all the exchanges and associations
can be revised and approved by the Commission. 13 8  The latter problem
can be alleviated by a concerted effort on the part of the CFTC and the
contract markets and member associations to coordinate and simplify the
types of internal proceedings which may be taken against a member accused
of wrongdoing by a customer. The former problem would seem to be
incurable without the addition of a new provision in the Act for exclusive
federal jurisdiction of claims arising from violations of its provisions.
The provisions and problems outlined in this section have universal
applicability. The following section will analyze the impact of the CFTCA
on litigation in the Seventh Circuit where, because of the fact that the heart
of the commodities industry resides within its confines, much of the law
construing the new Act will very likely be delineated.
THE IMPACT OF THE COMMODITIES FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION
ACT OF 1974 ON LITIGATION IN THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
With the exception of its refusal to recognize a discretionary commodi-
ties futures trading account as a security, 1 3 9 the decisions of the Seventh
Circuit in the area of commodities litigation have resembled those of most
other jurisdictions, although it has generally been more difficult to persuade
the Seventh Circuit courts that there is a cognizable action. The decisions
have enunciated several possible grounds for private recovery, including
violations of securities laws, violations of the Commodity Exchange Act,
violations of exchange rules, common law fraud and tort actions, and actions
based on a fiduciary duty between the broker and the customer. It would
seem to be a fair summary of the history of such litigation to say that the
courts have tried to find a remedy for a customer who has suffered a loss,
using whatever theory is most suitable to the fact situation presented in a
given case. This is not a predictable state of affairs for the plaintiff.
Unfortunately, the CFTCA has not relieved this uncertainty in any signifi-
cant degree. To comprehend this state of affairs a close examination of the
theories heretofore used for recovery and the possible impact on them of the
C7FTCA is necessary.
Goodman v. Hentz & Co.140 was the first case to consider an allegation
of a violation of the Commodity Exchange Act and is therefore an important
case to examine to elicit a sense of the direction the Seventh Circuit may
take in construing the new Act. It involved a suit by all persons allegedly
138. Until such time as the rules of exchanges can be comprehensively evaluated by
the CFTC, blanket approval of the old rules has been granted.
139. See Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 887 (1972).
140. 265 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
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defrauded by the defendant firm, which was a registered securities and
commodities broker. The plaintiffs failed in their attempts to allege a class
action because one of the plaintiffs had transacted with the defendant only in
an unregulated commodity--copper. Because of the unregulated nature of
the commodity, the plaintiff had "alleged no facts which could bring the
matter complained of within the scope of the Act [Commodities Exchange
Act], even if it be asusmed that a civil remedy is available in the federal
courts under the Commodity Exchange Act." '141
Several of the plaintiffs traded in both commodities and securities.
Based on the securities transactions, the court found that an action had been
stated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.142 In addition, it was
concluded that the securities and commodities transactions were part of a
single fraudulent scheme. 1 43  Therefore, all plaintiffs who had engaged in
both securities and commodities transactions (regardless of whether the
commodities were regulated or unregulated) could recover on the theory that
the fraud was perpetrated as part of a single scheme.144
Those plaintiffs who had traded only in regulated commodities present-
ed a different problem for the court. Citing Rosee v. Board of Trade of the
City of Chicago 45 for the proposition that the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals has left the question of a civil remedy for a defrauded investor
under the Commodities Exchange Act an open one,1 46 the Goodman court
found that a private right of action was available under the Act. 147  The
action sounded essentially in tort,' 48 with the court finding that there was
141. Id. at 443.
142. Id. at 445.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. 311 F.2d 524 (7th Cir. 1963).
146. 265 F. Supp. at 447.
147. Id.
148. The tort action the court recognized was based on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 286, which reads:
The court may adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man the
requirements of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation whose
_purpose is found to be exclusively or in part,
(a) to protect a class or persons which includes the one whose interest
is invaded, and;
(b) to protect the particular interest which is invaded, and;
(c) to protect that interest against the kind of harm which has resulted,
and;
(d) to protect that interest against the particular hazard from which the
harm results.
The court notes:
the [v~iolation of a legislative enactment by doing a prohibited act makes the
actor liable for the invasion of the interests of another if: (1) the intent of
the enactment is exclusively or in part to protect the interest of the other as
an individual; and (2) the interest invaded is one which the enactment is in-
tended to protect . . . . Violation of the standard of conduct set out in Sec-
tion 6b of the Commodity Exchange Act is a tort for which plaintiffs, as mem-
bers of the class Congress sought to protect from the type of harm they allege
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"no indication in the Commodity Exchange Act that Congress intended not
to allow private persons injured by violations access to the federal
courts."'
1 4 9
The case led to the dismissal of the claim of one plaintiff who alleged
precisely the same scheme to defraud as the other plaintiffs. Because the
particular commodity in which he traded was not regulated under the
Commodity Exchange Act, his claim was not cognizable. Those plaintiffs
who alleged trades in non-regulated commodities and alleged trading in
securities were permitted to recover for damages suffered as a result of both
kinds of trades, even though they could not have recovered for the unregu-
lated commodities trades under the rule set out by the same court to dismiss
the first plaintiff. And those plaintiffs who had traded only in regulated
commodities were permitted to recover under the Commodities Exchange
Act, while the plaintiff who had entered into essentially the same kind of
transaction, albeit in an unregulated commodity, was not permitted to
recover under that act. Thus, this single plaintiff who alleged the same type
of wrongdoing as his fellow litigants was denied a federal court forum for his
action.
The result of this case would be only slightly different under the
CFTCA. The plaintiff who traded in copper and was denied recovery
would now be covered under the Act because of the expansion of the
definition of commodities. 15 0 The Act does not clarify the existence or non-
existence of a private action for violation of its provisions, but the argument
of the Goodman case that Congress did not intend to deprive private persons
of a remedy is clearly a stronger one now than it was in 1967."' The
legislative history of the CFTCA indicates that the purpose of Congress was
to further protect the exchange customer, not to deprive him of protection.
The proviso in the Act" 5 2 that the jurisdiction of state and federal courts is
not superseded supports the presumption that the customer was intended to
be further protected by the Act. The only significant impact of the CF1CA
on this type of situation would be to eliminate the anomaly presented therein
of one plaintiff who alleged only transactions in unregulated commodities
being dismissed from the case while three others who alleged such trades, but
also had engaged in securities trades, were permitted to maintain their
action.
here, have a federal civil remedy even in the absence of specific mention of
a civil remedy in the Commodity Exchange Act.
265 F. Supp. at 447.
149. 265 F. Supp. at 447.
150. See 7 U.S.C.A. § 4a (Supp. I Feb. 1975).
151. But this is an example of how peculiar it is that a positive jurisdictional grant
has not been made by the CFTCA. The court had to go the length of turning a negative
presumption (no indication in the Commodities Exchange Act that Congress intended to
deprive an individual of a private action) into a positive theory of recovery under the
Act.
152. 7 U.S.C.A. § 4a (Supp. I Feb. 1975).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
Even though Goodman clearly stated what other cases had implied-
that there could be a private right of action for violation of some of the
provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act-still other attempts were made
to bring actions based on commodities transactions within the jurisdiction of
the federal courts under the securities acts. Milnarik v. M-S Commodities,
Inc.15s is a landmark Seventh Circuit decision representing an unsuccessful
attempt to bring such an action where discretionary trading accounts were
involved.15 4
The Milnarik court focused on the fact that it was the relationship
between the broker and the customer which had to be examined to deter-
mine whether an investment contract, as defined by the Securities Acts,
existed. Its analysis of that relationship led the court to reject the reasoning
of other decisions' 5 5 which had held that a discretionary trading account was
an investment contract.' 56 Other cases brought in the Seventh Circuit have
likewise rejected attempts to argue that contracts to purchase commodities
futures are investment contracts within the meaning of the federal securities
laws. 157
The CFTCA does not address this problem specifically. The Act, of
course, vests jurisdiction over all regulation of accounts, agreements and
trading in futures contracts in the Commission, 158 which would include the
discretionary accounts at issue in Milnarik. It also notes that the jurisdiction
of the Securities and Exchange Commission is not to be limited by the
Act.' 59 The SEC had not exercised its jurisdiction by recognizing discre-
tionary accounts or options as securities prior to the enactment of
CFTCA.160 Therefore, there should be little argument that the type of
153. 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972).
154. See discussion following note 57 supra.
155. For decisions which have held discretionary trading accounts to be investment
contracts, see Marshall v. Lamson Bros. & Co., 368 F. Supp. 486 (S.D. Ia. 1974);
Berman v. Orimex Trading, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Maheu v. Reynolds
& Co., 282 F. Supp. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
156. The plaintiff in Milnarik did not attempt to allege violations of the Commodity
Exchange Act. In light of the holding in Goodman it seems likely that such a cause of
action might have been stated. The hesitation to do so may have been due to the fact
that there was (and is) almost no case law under the Commodity Exchange Act with
which to buttress such a cause of action.
157. See Glazer v. National Commodity Res. & Stat. Serv., Inc., 388 F. Supp. 1341
(N.D. Il. 1974). (Plaintiffs purchased put and call options and the court found that
although the options might be considered an investment contract even when the underly-
ing futures contract couldn't be, the element of commonality was missing and so failed to
come under the securities laws.); Stevens v. Woodstock, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Ill.
1974) (The allegation that the agreement between plaintiff and defendant, setting up
plaintiff's commodities futures account, was an investment contract and thus a security,
and the commingling of the several plaintiffs' funds created a common enterprise, was
rejected by the district court.).
158. Perimeters, supra note 38, at 15.
159. 7 U.S.C.A. § 2 (Supp. I Feb. 1975).
160. See 457 F.2d at 278.
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situation exemplified by Milnarik will come under the jurisdiction of the
CFTC and the controversy over whether discretionary accounts are securities
should become irrelevant. 1 61
If there was apprehension about the success of attempting to state a
cause of action under the Commodity Exchange Act in 1972, it should
have been alleviated the following year by the decision in Deaktor v.
Schreiber.'6 2  The court in that case quoted favorably from Goodman and
ultimately concluded "that a private cause of action exists under the
Commodity Exchange Act."'1 13  The Seventh Circuit position has been
buttressed by what is at this time the only case which has been decided since
the enactment of -the CFTCA. In Case & Co. v. Board of Trade of the City of
Chicago,'6 the court of appeals considered an action by a plaintiff who
alleged he had suffered losses in the market as a result of the defendant's
temporary suspension of one of its rules, in violation of the Commodity
Exchange Act. 165 Although the dismissal of the plaintiff's cause of action
was affirmed, the court, without discussion, stated that "[lit is undisputed
that a private cause of action may be maintained under the Commodity
Exchange Act."'166
The decision that a private action will lie under the Commodity
Exchange Act (now the CFTCA) for violations of its provisions, combined
with the initiation by the Commissions of anti-fraud rules which track those
promulgated under the securities laws, 16 7 should serve to protect the inter-
ests of plaintiffs who have had, in the past, to resort to attempts to bring
their cases under securities laws.' 68
161. Commodity Regulation, supra note 6, at 39. However, as late as April 30,
1975, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held that
allegations of unlawful activity relating to commodity futures trading support a cause of
action under federal securities laws when the broker has control over investment
decisions and represents that profits will result from his efforts. Scheer v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 72 Civ. 3342 (WCC) (S.D.N.Y. April 30,
1975), reported in CCH COMMODITIES FuTuREs LAw REP. 20,039.
162. 479 F.2d 529 (7th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 414 U.S. 113 (1973).
163. Id. at 534. The court here determined that the Act was intended, at least in
part, to protect those who trade on the commodity exchanges.
164. Civil No. 74-1464 (7th Cir. Sept. 12, 1975), reported in CCH COMMODITY
FuTURES LAw REP. 20,079 at 10,720. Even though the decision was written after the
enactment of the CFTCA the Court was construing the old Commodity Exchange Act.
165. 7 U.S.C. §§ 7a(1) and 7a(2) (1970).
166. Civil No. 74-1464 (7th Cir. Sept. 1, 1975), reported in CCH COMMODITY
FuTUREs REP. 20,079 at 20,721.
167. The Commission has adopted anti-fraud rules, based on the language in 7
U.S.C.A. § 6b (Supp. I Feb. 1975). Rules 17 C.F.R. 30.01, 30.02 and 30.03. Future
rules will no doubt broaden the areas covered.
168. The conclusion that a private right of action exists for violation of the
Commodity Exchange Act will eliminate the problems presented in a case like Goodman
v. Hentz, 265 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1967), where a plaintiff was left with no remedy in
the federal courts. There are situations, however, where both securities and commodities
transactions are involved and it may be deemed desirable to bring them under the aegis
of only one applicable set of laws. Since the securities laws are the ones most litigants
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There is one other possible basis for federal jurisdiction of a case
involving commodities transaction in the Seventh Circuit.169 Violations of
private exchange rules, such as those in the New York Stock Exchange
(N.Y.S.E.) and the National Association of Securities Dealers (N.A.S.D.)
have been used as the basis for alleging a cause of action in numerous
securities cases. 170  They have met with varying degrees of success. 17' But
and attorneys are familiar with and they are the ones which have been interpreted by the
courts most extensively, it is conceivable that this degree of familiarity and predictability
would prompt attorneys to state a cause of action under the securities laws. A successful
example of this is the case of Powers v. Bouchard, Civil No. 75-417 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 11,
1975). In Powers the court determined that the allegation by plaintiff that she was
induced to invest in commodities by misrepresentation and fraud and that her securities
were sold in furtherance of the fraud was sufficient to confer jurisdiction on a federal
court. The opinion concluded that this scheme to defraud the plaintiff was done "in
connection with" the sale of the plaintiff's securities and was a violation of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) and rule lOb-5 (17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5)
promulgated thereunder.
No allegation was made that the sale of the securities was carried out in a way
which violated securities laws. The charge, which was accepted by the court, was that
because the proceeds of the securities sale were used to fund the fraudulently induced
commodities transactions there was a violation of rule lob-5.
169. The rationale for federal jurisdiction under these circumstances is that the rules
are promulgated pursuant to authority granted in the federal law. See, e.g., Avern Trust
v. Clarke, 415 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir. 1969).
170. See, e.g., Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 410 F.2d 135 (7th
Cir. 1969); Avern Trust v. Clarke, 415 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir. 1969); SEC v. First
Securities Co., 463 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1972).
171. It has been held that rule 405, the "Know Your Customer" rule of the New
York Stock Exchange, adopted pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15
U.S.C. §§ 78f, 78s), may be the basis of a cause of action in the federal courts in certain
situations. It was reasoned in Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 410
F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1969), that because the Rule has functions of public protection within
the overall statutory regulatory scheme supervised by the Securities and Exchange
Commission, such an action is justified. But Buttrey did not hold that a violation of rule
405 or other similar rules was a basis for a private right of action per se. This case must
be read in light of the fact that the facts alleged in the complaint were "tantamount to
fraud", 410 F.2d at 142, and that under those facts the defendant could be held liable for
a violation of rule lOb-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission.
In Avern Trust v. Clarke, 415 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir. 1969), the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals considered a complaint which alleged violations of article III, sections 1, 2,
and 18 of the Rules of Fair Practice of the National Association of Securities Dealers.
Section 2 requires that when a member recommends to a customer "the purchase, sale or
exchange of any security, he shall have reasonable grounds for believing that the
recommendation is suitable for such customer on the basis of the facts, if any, disclosed
by such customer as to his other security holdings and as to his financial situation and
needs". The court found that while section 2 was intended for the protection of
investors and under Buttrey, supra, might be the basis for a private right of action, the
dismissal of the count of the complaint alleging a violation of that section did not
prejudice the plaintiff "because the same theory was incorporated under the claim for
violation of section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78.
In SEC v. First Securities Co., 463 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1972), the court considered a
proceeding on the equitable receivership of the defendant firm in which the claims of
certain parties had been denied. One of the bases of liability discussed was that based
on the violation of rule 27 of the Rules of Fair Practice of the National Association of
Securities Dealers. Rule 27 deals with the responsibility of member firms to supervise
the activities of their registered representatives. The court concluded that the rule had
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the few cases which have held that a private right of action may be
maintainable for violations of the N.Y.S.E. and N.A.S.D. rules have consid-
ered them in conjunction with allegations of fraud under other sections of the
securities act.
There is no case on record yet which has considered whether violations
of the rules of a commodities exchange would be the basis for a private right
of action.172 Although many brokers are members of both securities and
commodities exchanges, it cannot be assumed that violations of rules promul-
gated by one exchange can be used as a basis for a right of action for
transactions which occur on another one. The Commodities Futures Trad-
ing Commission has recognized that the transactions regulated under the
Commodity Exchange Act are not necessarily governable by the same
principles as those regulated under the Securities Acts. 173  Although it is
likely that the principles which have been used to develop a private right of
action under N.A.S.D. and N.Y.S.E. rules will likewise be developed based
on rules of the commodity exchanges, 174 such an action does not now exist.
The Seventh Circuit has steadfastly refused to expand the protection of
securities laws to plaintiffs suffering losses in commodities futures trading.
been violated by the defendants and further concluded that such a violation would
"provide a basis for private damage actions where the rule violated serves to protect the
public. [citing Buttrey and Avern Trust, supra.] First Securities is properly liable for
Nay's fraud because of its violation of Rule 27 of the N.A.S.D.". 463 F.2d at 988. This
is the most definitive statement of the three cases that such a private right of action
exists. But it still must be noted that even in First Securities a violation of rule 10b-5
was also determined by the court to have taken place.
172. There is now a case pending in the Circuit Court of Cook County, based on a
violation of rule 813 of the International Money Market. International Currency, Ltd.
v. Lamson Bros. & Co., Civil No. 75 L 3264 (Cir. Ct. of Cook County, filed Feb. 21,
1975).
173. See 40 Fed. Reg. 26504 (1975) where the CFTC published a notice regarding
its adoption of anti-fraud rules. The notice reads in pertinent part:
The operative language of the proposed rules tracked the antifraud provi-
sions of Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5 under the Securities
Exchange Act, 17 CFR 240.10b-5. While the Commission believes that the
interpretive approach taken by the courts with respect to Rule lOb-5 would gen-
erally be satisfactory if applied to prevent deceptive acts and practices in con-
nection with transactions covered by the options and foreign market anti-fraud
rules, the Commission is persuaded, on the basis of comments it has received,
that uniformity of rules in the commodity area is desirable. As a result, the
Commission feels it would be inappropriate generally to apply the language of
Rule 10b-5 to the commodity futures or other transactions regulated under the
Commodity Exchange Act, as amended, since this might invite an uncritical
application of security law, principals and practices.'
'The Commission is particularly concerned with the possibility
that determinations reached on commodity cases might misapply non-
disclosure-of-information standards taken from securities laws deci-
sions, although it fully appreciates that a failure to disclose may op-
erate as a fraud or deceit with respect to commodity transactions in
certain circumstances.
174. The rules of the commodity exchanges will be strictly monitored by the CFTC
according to the terms of the CFTCA, 7 U.S.C.A. § 7a (Supp. I Feb. 1975) and the
CFTC has the power to impose penalties on boards of trade which do not comply with
its orders.
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Consistent with this position is the conclusion in this circuit that a claim for
relief for damages may be asserted by an individual who has suffered losses
in the commodities markets as a result of violations of the Commodity
Exchange Act. This situation, combined with the emphasis in the CFTCA
on protection of the customer, puts the plaintiff bringing an action in the
Seventh Circuit in a position of strength. The paucity of law developed
under the Commodity Exchange Act will make the task of interpreting the
types of actions which will be cognizable under the CFTCA difficult. The
legislative history of the Act and the rules and regulations to be promulgated
by the Commission will be useful in this regard. It is also probable that the
trend towards permitting an action based on violations of the rules of
securities exchanges and associations will be expanded to include similar
rules of the commodities exchanges. In short, the Seventh Circuit is certain
to embrace this new regulatory act and will no doubt play an instrumental
role in the construction of its provisions.
CONCLUSION
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974 was enacted
in response to the recognition that the commodities futures industry had
outgrown its regulatory structure. The complications began when traders
who had no interest in the commodities underlying the contracts they dealt in
entered the market. The high leverage in commodities trading holds out the
promise of astronomical returns on the "investment" required to initiate a
trading account. That sort of prognosis attracts many unsuspecting people
uneducated as to the risks involved and others who see only a way to make
money quickly. The lack of business sophistication of many customers is
matched only by that of numerous employees of brokerage houses whose
training and licensing is minimally regulated. All of these factors, combined
with the volatility of the market, lead to an explosive situation. Although
some mechanisms for control were available under the Commodity Exchange
Act, they were neither vigorously enforced nor adequate to meet this new
situation.
The CFTCA provides a vehicle for attacking many of these vices. The
internal functioning of the exchanges will be more stringently supervised.
Brokers, registered representatives and other brokerage house employees
may be required to meet certain standards before being permitted to trade
on the exchanges. Provisions have been made for programs which will
educate all concerned parties. The basic lure of a high level of return on
investment remains and will continue to attract to the market people whose
capabilities for using it effectively are limited.
The high volume of litigation which has developed in this field in recent
years will no doubt continue. The Act provides new forums for certain
aggrieved parties, which will result in productive approaches to resolving
many of the disagreements which have until this time been relegated to
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the courts. Through these procedures new substantive rights which have
been afforded customers in the Act can be pursued. No limitations have
been placed on the right of any party to make use of remedies previously
available in the courts. As the CFTC develops rules and regulations under
the law, the substantive rights which may be vindicated in these old forums
will no doubt increase.
Despite the dramatic new provisions of the CFTCA, there remain
problematical areas. The major criticisms of the Act are its failure to
specifically delineate a private action for violation of its terms, the omission
of a grant of exclusive jurisdiction and the related possibility it leaves for the
occurrence of multiple and concurrent litigation in actions brought for such
violations. The first omission is not of great consequence in the Seventh
Circuit. The expanded scope of the regulatory provisions will, however,
make obsolete the arguments used outside the Seventh Circuit in the Maheu
line of cases to define discretionary trading accounts as investment contracts
under the Securities Act. However, these decisions remain valid law and the
approach courts will now take in confronting similar actions brought after the
passage of the CFTCA will be interesting to observe. Clearly, the defini-
tions of the new law and the intent expressed in its passage indicate that
discretionary accounts are within the purview of the CFTCA. The only
rational alternative for any court to follow would be to deny future recovery
in such cases if the action is founded on the theory that the account is an
investment contract. Likewise, any foothold which the SEC might have
attained in this area should be abandoned in favor of the jurisdiction of the
CFTC.
The failure to grant exclusive federal court jurisdiction to vindicate
rights protected by the Act is a major omission. The rationale for making
such a provision is as justified in the commodities industry as it is in the
securities areas, where such a provision is a reality. This failure of the Act
leaves open the possibility of multiple and concurrent litigation upon which
there is now no effective curb in this particular area. The CFTCA may
even complicate the problem by raising the possibility of the existence of new
substantive rights which may be enforced in whatever forum is most
appealing to the plaintiff.
Viewed in its entirety the Act must be recognized as a major break-
through in the control of an industry which has been subject to multiple
abuses. Most courts should welcome the addition of guidelines for litigation
which the provisions of the Act must incidentally provide and no doubt some
courts, such as those in the Seventh Circuit, will be provided ample
opportunity to further refine its import. All factions of the commodities
industry should benefit from the new Act and the industry itself should be
strengthened.
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